The fall of the USSR on December 26, 1991, marked the dawn of a unilateral world centered on the American model. The globalization that ensued, with the victory of the liberal economic model, was, according to President Bill Clinton, “the economic equivalent of a natural force, like wind or water […] something that can be contained or stopped.“
However, successive crises, concealing strategic and geopolitical realities, seem to have eroded this model, leading to a gradual regionalization whose effects are being felt in the early stages of 2024.
I. From the consecration of a unipolar world in 1992
Paradoxically, the fall of the USSR marked the beginning of an intensive interventionist period by Western powers. Indeed, the disappearance of a “superpower” capable militarily and politically of influencing international relations and counterbalancing American dominance left a “void” geopolitically that the United States would not fail to fill. The collective security model established by the United Nations seems finally effective, and the military structures of Western powers, masters of the game, are evolving. They are evolving to transform into a projection force capable of reaching the hotspots of the globe. The proliferation of asymmetric conflicts deeply shapes the military doctrines of the coming decades. The fear of a generalized conventional conflict in European territory fades away.
The effectiveness of the collective security model resulting from the fall of the USSR is actually a deception. The doctrines of preventive self-defense resulting from the terrorist attacks of 2001 constitute a negation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Illegal military interventions in terms of international law have multiplied with impunity. The world is unilateral, dominated by American hegemony. Paradoxically, what founded the strength of the UN model during the Cold War was the balance of power. International law was a viable tool because it allowed disputes between competing states with equivalent power to be resolved. The solutions reached were not satisfactory, but at least they helped to ease some tensions. However, the fall of a major actor on the international scene shattered this model. The resolution of a conflict no longer passes through a subtle balancing act between two competing powers, but through the will of one. The principles of the Charter thus lose their substance, as no international actor can rely on rivalries between two blocs of powers to support its claims by using the principles stemming from the Charter.
II. From the notion of a multipolar world
What do we mean by multipolar? The term is often attributed to Primakov, Russian Foreign Minister under Yeltsin. It symbolizes the historical partnership between the Russian Federation and China in 1996. In reality, the term would have been used for the first time by Kissinger: “In the years to come, the most profound challenge facing American policy will be philosophical: to develop a concept that characterizes the international order in a militarily bipolar but politically multipolar world. […] This challenge is especially crucial with regard to the new nations.” It foreshadows the emergence of a world in which the USA could have been at the forefront. The French Academy defines multipolar as, in its political sense, “international relations involving several powers constituting as many distinct poles of power and decision-making.”
History is made of symbolic, at best imprecise, dates. Can we really identify an event marking the end of unilateralism? In reality, the emergence of a multilateral world finds its sources in the growth of state actors that were previously marginal or non-existent. Kissinger rightly considered that the rise of the “global South” is both the origin and consequence of the emergence of this international balance. Unilateralism would therefore be more an “anomaly” than a lasting position on the international stage. But this unilateral view of the world seems to be the only outcome envisaged by Western powers.
Roughly, very roughly, we will consider different dates marking key stages in the emergence of this multipolar model. The 1996 partnership between China and Russia seems to be an important date. But its significance needs to be relativized: these two countries do not yet have privileged relations, and Russia still seems to lean towards a liberal model, if not ultra-liberal. Conflicts in the Middle East and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, on the contrary, are signs of a world dominated by the USA. These interventions are diplomatically contested on the international stage, but no more. Conflicts between Russia and Chechnya could serve as a breaking point. However, the first Chechen war (1994-1996) occurred for electoral reasons and the second war (1999-2000) seems to fit into what would be similar to the doctrine of preventive self-defense invoked by the USA in 2004 in the margins of the fight against terrorism.
A set of symbolic events seem to mark this rupture: the Munich conference of 2007 followed by the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 seem, in hindsight, to be diplomatic and then military responses to this unilateral vision of international relations. It is worth dwelling on these examples, symbolically strong. The Munich conference of 2007, an international security forum, marked by Vladimir Putin’s speech on February 10, 2007, went unnoticed: “What is a unipolar world? Despite all the attempts to embellish this term, in practice it means only one thing: it is a single center of power, a single center of force, and a single center of decision. It is the world of one master, one sovereign. Ultimately, this is fatal to all those within this system as well as to the sovereign himself, who will self-destruct from within.” Symbolically, the break with the world born in 1991 is clear and for several reasons. Firstly, this speech defines Russia’s position on the international stage: it will no longer seek rapprochement and appeasement with what is commonly referred to as the West. Furthermore, within the framework of a forum on collective security, a State openly declares for the first time its opposition to the dominant international order. Finally, Russia seeks to position itself as the main actor in favor of a multipolar world. It thus concentrates all the tensions: indeed, leading actors in this regionalization of international power centers are more discreet (such as India or China, leading actors of this trend).
The military intervention in Georgia is in line with this declaration: through a three-day military intervention, the Russian Federation uses a conflict between South Ossetians and Georgians to diplomatically neutralize a more liberal Georgia approaching NATO. This conflict, unnoticed in 2008, shares painful similarities with that in Ukraine. Violently, Russia puts a stop to the integration into NATO of a Caucasus country, historically a Russo-Turkish sphere of influence.
III. A construction that is difficult to stop
Beyond these events unnoticed by their contemporaries, several data act as evidence of the construction of a world escaping unilateral will. New political, economic, and military powers are emerging. The GDP in purchasing power parity of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in 2008 exceeded that of the European Union. In 2023, that of the BRICS (BRIC + South Africa) exceeds that of the G7. Third World countries or oil-producing countries are looking for new partners who are increasingly opposed to the United States.
But this game of alliances and partnerships is marked by this regionalization of the world: the BRICS do not form a united bloc but result from a convergence of interests between regional powers that may be in opposition. It
should be noted that the BRICS (currently BRICS+) aim to promote economic and financial partnerships. It is therefore indeed a spearhead of a new global economic order, but not strictly speaking an alliance: each member state plays to its area of influence, advances its pawns, and does not hesitate to compete with its other partners.
More advanced partnerships in technology and the military, such as that between Iran, China, and Russia, are also marked by rivalries and interests that may be competing. Western countries also respond to this competitive logic, but it must be acknowledged that it is attenuated around a generally uniform policy.
Let’s leave the last word to Nixon. In 1992, he declared: “I often hear that the Cold War is over and the West has won. That is only part of the truth. For in reality, communism has been defeated, but the notion of freedom is now on trial. If democracy works in Russia, then it will be an example for other nations, such as China. If democracy fails, then nothing will push other states to adopt this model. It is therefore vital that the democratic model works in Russia because this country, which exported communist values to the entire world for seventy years, will thus export democracy, freedom, and the fruits of freedom.” Currently, it is implicitly suggested that behind this opposition between a unilateral vision of the world and a multilateral vision, the survival of our democracies and the export of our model are at stake. But have we not created our own enemies by wanting to oppose the emergence of an inevitable world order? And if we had allowed a slower transition of former communist states towards a liberal model, would the situation not be fundamentally different today?
Alexandre Lecarpentier
References
1. « Remarks at Vietnam National University in Hanoi », 17th of November 2000
2. Military intervention in January 1991 in Kuwait in accordance with Article 42, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In principle, the use of force is illegal in international law (Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter) except in cases of legitimate defense (Article 51 of the Charter) or under Article 42.
3. Refer to the White Paper of 1994, and “Reflections on Global Strategic Evolution” (interviews with Jean Claude Mallet, Esprit 2014/8-9 August).
4. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” a document published by the White House in September 2002 (source: legitimate defense, yesterday and today: the “realist residue” of international law? by Thierry Ménnissier)
5. NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without prior decision from the Security Council; American intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003). The question of the legality of the intervention in Kosovo and Afghanistan is still debated, the former being considered legitimate due to humanitarian imperatives, the latter being considered legal based on Security Council Resolution 1373.
6. “Clash of titans or Trojan horse in multilateralism? The stakes of a multipolar order for China and Russia” by Régine Perron in International Relations 2024/1.
7. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Three Essays, Londres, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, p79-80
8. Outil de consultation du dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 9e édition
9. Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich conference, 10th of February 2007
10. For example, Sino-Indian relations are tense, if not conflictual: the 1962 war definitely did not resolve the border conflicts between the two powers. Since 2020, numerous border incidents have been noted. Moreover, India is trying to counter China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean. For instance, a deep structural overhaul of the Indian army has been initiated to address the escalating tensions between India and its neighbors, including China.
11. Iran-China agreement of March 2021 and Iran-Russia agreement of May 2023; integration of Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2023. This organization, born out of the 1996 partnership between China and Russia mentioned earlier, reflects Russia’s desire to turn towards its peaceful facade. This organization, aiming to foster strategic and security partnerships among Central Asian states, has become a tool aimed at countering American influence in the region. It is indicative of a system of alliances tinged with rivalries among certain members (the integration of India into the organization in 2017, advocated by Primakov in 1998, and Pakistan to appease China, India’s rival).
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